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Faculty Association
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Logan, Utah

FORTy-FOURTH ANNUAL HONOR LECTURE
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY

A basic objective of the Faculty Association of Utah State
University, in the words of its constitution, is:
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its members by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two
annual faculty research lectures in the fields of (1) the biological and exact sciences, including engineering, called the
Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences; and
(2) the humanities and social sciences, including education
and business administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor
Lecture in the Humanities.
The administration of the University is sympathetic with
these aims and shares, through the Scholarly Publications Committee, the costs of publishing and distributing these lectures.
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty
Association. Among the factors considered by the committee in
choosing lecturers are, in the words of the constitution:
(1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2)
publication of research through recognized channels in the
field of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over
an extended period of years; (4) personal influence in developing the character of the students.

Frederic H. Wagner was selected by the committee to deliver
the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural Sciences. On
behalf of the members of the Association we are happy to present
Professor Wagner's paper:

Coyotes and Sheep: Some Thoughts on Ecology,
Economics and Ethics
Committee on Faculty Honor Lecture
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INTRODUCTION

To many persons not in the profession, the term wildlife
management largely connotes the husbandry of fish, birds, or
mammals for hunting and fishing purposes. Even if we grant an
implied breadth in his use of the term "recreation," Leopold's
(1933:3) definition of game management in his classic book by the
same name tends to foster this impression: " ... the art of making
land produce sustained annual crops of wild game for recreational
use."
Today's wildlife manager assumes a broader scope to his
field. That scope includes the management of wild animal populations and their environments for a number of values in addition
to the recreational. Preservation of rare and endangered species,
and of representative, undisturbed areas of the earth's ecosystems
fall within his area of responsibility as does the husbandry of fish
and game resources purely for food and other products (d. Dasmann, 1964). Control of wild animals deemed to be nuisances for
one reason or another also falls within this area.
- Control of animals which prey on livestock or other wildlife
/ is, of course, part of this latter responsibility. Most wildlifers
"( would agree that predator control is potentially a part of any wild-

/ life management program, and The Wildlife Society in its position
statement on animal control ". . . recognized that control of
animals to minimize damage caused by animal populations is an
essential element in a sound program of wildlife management."
(Anon., n.d.) . Indeed, intensive predator control has long been
an integral part of wildlife management in Europe.
However, the position of many American wildlife managers
on predator control is an ambivalent one. For while it is adopted
in principle, as in The Society's statement, it is seldom put into
general practice as a measure for increasing wildlife populations
for recreational use. The reasons are several. First, there is still
a great deal of uncertainty about just how influential predators
are in affecting the population levels of game species. Second, even
if effective, a general predator control program over an area the
size of a state would be extremely expensive. Third, most American wildlifers have a strong ecological background which predisposes them to value the full diversity of the natural world, and
to be hesitant over very extreme single-value alteration of the biota
for game.
This ambivalence is by no means shared by all groups of the
American society. One area in which, until recent years, predator
control has been carried out without self-doubt is in the support
of agriculture for the protection of domestic animals. In most
value systems, the production of food and income is ranked above
the esthetic and recreallimal. And the same singleness of purpose
which has plowed under major parts of continents has not questioned the extreme reduction, if not elimination, of predatory animals. Reinforced by the deep-seated prejudice against predators
pervading Occidental culture (Allen, 1954) and probably most
the food-producing incentive prompted the organization
others,
/
of a large, federal predator-control organization during World War
I.
The organization grew during the 1920's and 30's, coming to
be known in the latter decade as the Division of Predator and
Rodent Control in the De artment of Interior's Fish and Wildlife
Service . Reorganized in the 1960's, it is now called the Division
of Wildlife Services in Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife. Today the Division employs a staff of over 600 personnel,
and operates on a budget of some $8 million. Over three-fourths
of this budget is spent on predator contror'in roughly that part
of the United States west of the 100th meridian, and about 60
percent of the cost is paid by the livestock industry.
4

Despite its unwanted-stepchild aura to so many American
wildlife managers, the size of the federal program, plus the resources and effort pumped into state and local bounties and other
control measures, make predator control one of the largest, single
wildlife management activities in the United States. Yet, predator
control receives scant attention in wildlife management textbooks,
perhaps because so many persons in the profession are not aware
of its extent, perhaps because of the sensitivities surrounding the
subject.
Perhaps in part for these same reasons, predator control has
not generally received the research attention needed to give a clear
picture (1) of the degree to which different predatory species, and
combinations thereof, influence wildlife populations, and (2) of
the costs, ecological side effects, and game-population responses to
predator control (Wagner et aI., 1967). In all fairness, one must
say that such studies would be complex and quite costly. Many
research administrators doubtless question the wisdom of committing major funds to such studies which, even if they demonstrated favorable game responses, might well point to management
programs that would be too costly, socially unpalatable, and ecologically undesirable. Nevertheless, the result is a continued inadequacy in our understanding of the role predation plays in the
ecosystem.
If we can rationalize to a degree the reasons why we have
not had more research on predator control as a game-management
tool, it is more difficult to rationalize the lack of research into
predator control to reduce livestock losses. Here we have an established program costing several millions of dollars a year. Even if
the federal government did not recognize a responsibility to evaluate it, one would think that the self-interest of the livestock industry would pressure for an examination of what benefit it was
realizing from its outlay.
The industry has obviously accepted on faith the assumption
that the benefits equaled the cost. But Durward L. Allen, former
Chief of Wildlife Research for the Fish and Wildlife Service, has
told me that he repeatedly requested funds during the 1950's for
evaluation of federal predator control, and his requests never received serious consideration, presumably because such research
would arouse the concern of the Predator and Rodent Control
Division. In more recent years, since the re-organized Division of
Wildlife Services has been under the able and objective administration of Jack H. Berryman, research funds to evaluate the program
have still been wholly inadequate. And the industry remains convinced that it is getting value received from its expenditure.
5

It is a growing environmental awareness in the American
public which is beginning to raise ecologieal, economic, and ethical
questions about predator control. An increasingly mobile, outdoors-minded populace is becoming aware of its nation's natural
heritage, and is experiencing it and enjoying its diversity. Aware
that by statute all wildlife in the United States belongs to the
people, that public is beginning to assert that predators have positive as well as negative values and that any predator-management
program must rightfully acknowledge and take into account these
multiple values.

Aware of this rising tide of public opinion, and himself committed to a plurality of values in our natural resources, Secretary
of Interior Stewart L. Udall appointed a five-man committee in
1963 to evaluate predator control. Subsequently termed "the
Leopold Committee" after its chairman, A. Starker Leopold, the
Committee was given a short period to carry out its survey, but no
time or resources to conduct any in-depth research. The report
(Leopold et aI., 1964), while basically holding that some predator
control for the protection of the livestock industry was economically and ethically justified, recommended numerous changes in the
administration and practice of federal predator control. It was
out of the Committee's recommendations that the Division of
Wildlife Services was formed, and a professional biologist, Jack
H. Berryman, appointed as its chief.
By the early 1970's, the public had become more, not less,
restive about predator control. Although Berryman had made
major strides in professionalizing and streamlining the work of his
Division, and in general had carried out the recommendations of
the Leopold Report, there was still a considerable amount of business-as-usual in the operations of the Division. While the Leopold
Report concluded that the predator-control efforts in many areas
were in excess of the need, it still conceded the need for a sizeable
agency employed to carry out widespread control activities in
western United States. These activities were not now condoned by
much of the public. In addition, militant conservation organizations were unearthing and publicizing cases of insubordinate violations of Berryman's operating procedures. These were often
implied to be regular occurrences when in fact such cases were
promptly followed by disciplinary action, and in general the operations of the division had been substantially tightened.
In any event, in June, 1971, Chairman Russell E. Train of
President Nixon's Council on Environmental Quality, and Secretary of Interior, Rogers C. B. Morton appointed a seven-man Ad6

visory Committee on Predator Control and charged it with examing the entire question within a four-month period. A. S. Leopold
was asked to sit on this Committee, and Stanley A. Cain, former
Assistant Secretary of Interior, was asked to serve as Chairman.
The Committee, hereinafter called the "Cain Committee,"
was asked "to review and analyze the predator control, and associated other animal control programs and policies of the United
States, evaluating their direct and indirect effects including environmental impacts and alternatives to present practices."
'Since my students and I had been carrying out research on
coyote ecology in northern Utah and southern Idaho for several
years, I as a Cain Committee member was asked to address my
attention to the questions of coyote control and sheep losses. These
questions needed particular attention because the major raison
d'etre of western predator control is the reduction _of sheep losses
by reducing g>yote ntimber&. Coyotes are among !he mosl abun5iant.1!!!d widespread of predators in western United S~te~. And
most livestock predatory losses are incurred by the sheep industry,
./ largely from coyote predation. Cattle are generally too large
to be preyed upon to any signficant degree, and other domestic
\ animals are either of very limited distribution, or largely protected
\ by enclosure near to farm and ranch houses.
The Cain Committee operated under the same difficulty
as the Leopold Committee: inadequate time and resources to
mount any actual research program. However, it was possible to
delve into existing information from a variety of sources, and use
this as a basis for the recommendations made in the Committee's
report (Cain et aI., 1972).
This lecture summarizes some of the findings we were able
to marshall on the questions of coyote control and sheep losses.
Some of the material reported herein was included in the Cain
Committee report, some was not. The views reported here are my
own. For the most part, the members of the Cain Committee were
in agreement on the recommendations made. But shades of differences will inevitably occur among seven individuals, and the shades
I present here may in a few cases differ slightly in hue from the
opinions reached by other members of the group. However, they
agree in essence with most points made in the Cain Committee
report.
Four basic questions seemed to need answers in order to
evaluate this aspect of predator control:
1.

What is the effectiveness of individual control techniques,
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combinations of these, and how much do the existing controls reduce coyote populations?
2.

What is the magnitude of sheep losses and how much do
existing control measures reduce those losses? How might
these losses differ with different patterns of control? A
corollary question is the relationship between coyote
population density and the magnitude of sheep losses?

3.

What are the ecological side effects of coyote control?

4.

What are the conflicting values - economic, ecological,
ethical, and esthetic - which might be weighed in making any decision on predator control. No decision will
satisfy all of these values, but whichever is made should
be in the interest of the long-range, maximum collective
benefit for society and the environment which sustains
that society.

The evidence reported herein was marshalled to answer those
questions. None is answered unequivocally, but the patterns
that develop in the data suggest hypotheses which can serve as
bases for interim action and point the way for sound research.

SOURCES OF DATA
NEEDED DATA

In traditional scientific methodology, answers to questions like
Nos. 1-3 posed above are obtained through experimentation. The
factor whose influence we wish to understand would be manipulated, and we would observe the effect of that manipulation on
the entity or process which the factor supposedly affects. In this
context, answers to question Nos. 1-3 would be obtained by
setting up experimental areas in which we would use different
I combinations and intensities of control measures and observe the
effects on (1) coyote populations, and (3) non-target predatory
species; and in which we (2) would manipulate coyote numbers
\ and observe the effects on sheep-loss rates.
Populations of coyotes and other predatory species are undoubtedly influenced by a number of variables besides artificial
control, and ~heep are lost to a vari~ty of causes ~esides p~.
In the physical sciences, extraneous variables such as these are
8

controlled in the laboratory to prevent any unwanted "noise" in
the experimental results. In the field situation facing many ecologists, such extraneous variables usually cannot be controlled. Consequently, each experiment must be replicated a number of times
and carried out over a number of years in order to average out the
effects of these variables, and permit the experimenter to separate
their effects from those of the ones under examination.
Coyotes and other predatory species are highly mobile, and
undergo long-range, annual population dispersal. Experiments such
as these would require very large areas - e.g., major portions of
states - in order to avoid variation imposed by emigration and
immigration. Knowlton's (1972) evidence suggested major influx
into areas the size of counties in Texas. In addition to the need
for large experimental areas, reliable methods for counting coyote
and other animal numbers would be needed, as well as reliable
methods for counting sheep losses.
Even though experiments like these have not been purposefully designed, they have been approximately and inadvertently
set up. The federal predator-control operations in each state
have varied over time, and their programs differ between states.
But they have kept records of these programs as well as dat.a
which can provisionally be used to indicate changes in the populations of coyotes and other carnivorous mammals. The Division
of Wildlife Services, the U.S. Forest Service, and the FederalState Crop and Livestock Reporting Services have made estimates
of sheep losses which can be compared with indicated changes in
coyote populations. Each state for a period of years with a given
coyote control regime, or with a given mean coyote density, becomes an experimental replicate and the several western states
each for two or more time periods constitute a number of such
replicates.
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE SERVICES RECORDS

Indices of Predator Populations. - Field agents of the Division of Wildlife Services keep tallies of the number of coyotes
known to have been destroyed by the various control techniques,
and the annual totals for each state are kept on file in each, state
office. These do not purport to be the total number of animals
killed, as many of those destroyed by toxicants are never seen
because they die at some distance and time after consuming the
poison. But these totals can perhaps be viewed as the resultant
of the state control group's effort, and if that can be standardized
-i.e., if the kill can be placed on a coyotes-killed-per-man-year
9

basis - the success of the group can perhaps be expected to bear
some relationship to the number of coyotes existing in a state
and be usable as an index thereof. Since the division has also
kept careful, annual records of the number of men employed each
year, the data are available for calculating a standardized index.
- There is some risk in such calculations in that the different
control technique~ have not been used with equal intensity over
the years, Thus,\ trapping was important in the 20's and 40y
Coyote "getter~" (to be described below) were important in the
. 1950's; and in the 1960's and 1970's there has been an increased
effort in shooting from ground and air, and in finding and destroying spring- dens. _But these are the techniques which take animals
that are recorded. It is a basic premise of this study that these
were used sequentially; and that each compensated for the others
in its respective period of use. The result is something approaching
constancy in those techniques which kill animals that are found.
And the success of those techniques can consequently be used as
indices of population abundance.

~

One small test can be made of the validity of the coyoteskilled-per-man-year indices. ( The values for Utah can be compared
with the annual number of coyotes bountied in the state, the assumption being that the annual number bountied also reflects
the size of the coyote populatioiY. (The bountied animals are not
the same as those taken by Division employees who are not permitted to bounty the animals which they kill.) This comparison
shows a close similarity in trend suggesting that we are looking
at real indices of coyote population change in the state (Figure 1).
Records of Control Activities. - In addition to maintaining
annual records of the numbers of predatory animals taken, the
division has kept records of the number of men employed annually
(man-years of effort) for the past 30 to 40 years. It has also kept
records in most states, but often for shorter time intervals, on the
number of traps, poison baits, and other control measures used each
year. These have been extremely useful in exploring the effects of
some control measures on coyote populations.
Records of Sheep Losses. - From the early 1940's to the
time of his retirement in 1965, Owen Morris, former Utah director
of the division, made a concerted effort to tally predatory losses
in the state each year. At the end of each year, he personally
contacted a leading sheep rancher in each county of Utah and
asked him to contact the sheepmen in his county and obtain reports of all sheep lost. These were then compiled and reported in
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Figure 1.

Comparison of Annual Coyotes-Killed-Per-Man-Year Indices from Division of
Wildlife Services Records and Annual Number of Coyotes Bountied in Utah.

Morris's annual reports. They were reported as totals and not
converted to percentages, a fact that may allay suspicion that the
trends in percentages shown later were colored to support his
Division's efforts. For the purpose of this report, the annual loss
totals have been divided by the yearly total number of sheep in the
state estimated by the Federal Crop and Livestock Reporting
Service, and converted to percentage killed by predators.
In addition to these Utah records, division personnel in several
western states have kept annual records of reported. sheep losses
11

which they have seen. These have not been the systematic efforts
that Morris carried out in Utah, and hence they do not purport
to be anywhere near complete tallies of the losses. They have also
not been maintained continuously over the years. But, they can
perhaps be used as indices of trends over the years if one can
assume that a relatively constant force of men will receive more
reports of losses in years with heavy depredations, and fewer reports in years of light losses.
The critical reader may question the use of these kinds of
data, particularly in the preseJ'lt, hostile climate surrounding
federal, predator-control operations. The suspicion will inevitably
arise that division personnel mLy have shaded their records for
one purpose or another, to reflect favorably on their operations.
Conceivably, some trappers might have inflated their reported
kill to curry favor with superiors or sheep ranchers. In more recent
years, numbers of animals killed or amount of toxic agents, traps,
etc., could be under-J ported to ease public criticism.
It is possible that such biases have been introduced in some
cases. But, my own impression upon looking at these records, and
talking ",ith many of the personnel, is that they have been kept
as consc_dntiously and accurately as possible. The trends over the
years have been smooth and continuous, often following similar
patterns in different states. They are the only data on predato;
numbers we have, and one of the only three sets of long-term
data we have on sheep losses. Without them, we are left only with
the numerous subjective and episodic reports frequently cited in
the 'contemporary media. It is a major hypothesis of this report
that these data can be used with some reservation to shed light on
the questions at hand.
THE FEDERAL-STATE CROP AND LIVESTOCK REPORTING SERVICE
ESTIMATES

Sometimes termed the U.S. Department of Agriculture Statistical, Reporting Service, this agency sends questionnaires each
year to large samples of stockmen in each state. These questionnaires are the basis for estimating total numbers of sheep in each
state annually, the lamb crops produced, and the number of sheep
lost !o all causes. This valuable 50-year set of data has been extremely useful in analyzing total losses due to all causes over the
years.
These would appear to be some of the most reliable estimates
available, for they only entail counting and no interpretations of
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the causes of loss. They do not provide any estimate of predator
losses, but they do place a ceiling on any such estimates in that the
predator losses cannot exceed the total. Like Morris's and the
Forest Service estimates (see below) these statistics have only
been recorded as numbers of animals, no attempt having been
made to convert them to percentages.
During the years 1966-1969, the reporting services in the states
of Montana, W"oming, Colorado, and Texas asked stockmen to
report the numbers of sheep lost to predators. This information
was requested in addition to the regular information on the questionnaires described above. These data were tabulated and summarized by Reynolds and Gustad (1971) of the Division of Wildlife Services. They provide one set of estimates of sheep predatory
losses over a four-year period.

J.

S. FOREST SERVICE RECORDS

Forest Service district rangers keep records of the numbers
of livestock placed on the western National Forests at the beginning of each grazing year, and the numbers removed at the end
of the season. The difference between these two numbers constitutes the total loss during the season due to all causes. The stockmen involved are asked to assess the causes of loss, as nearly as
possible, and hence predator losses during the period are estimated.
These records are available over .several decades.
The loss values are, of course, lower than the year-round
estimates. The sheep have borne lambs prior to movement onto
the Forests, and the lambing-ground losses have therefore been
sustained prior to this season. Winter losses, which may be a
substantial part of the annual total, are also not included in these
grazing-season estimates.
As in the case of the Division of Wildlife Services estimates,
one needs to consider the possibility that these estimates are consciously or unconsciously shaded to reflect favorably on some
aspect of predator control. This seems quite improbable. Forest
Service personnel have no vested interest in any particular control
technique, or in control itself. Further, their data, like the division's, are compilations of reports by individual stockmen over
the state as a whole. The stockmen's reports are made to the
numerous District Rangers who then transmit the information to
the regional office for compilation. The compilations are of total
numbers of sheep lost, and it is for the purpose of this report that
total number of sheep lost has been divided by the total number
of sheep grazed on the National Forests to derive annual percentages or loss rates.
13
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CHRONOLOGY AND METHODS OF COYOTE
CONTROL

Had experiments been designed to measure the effectiveness
of different kinds and intensities of coyote control, various techniques would have been employed at carefully controlled levels
in replicated fashion, and population responses measured. In fact,
the variation has come as predator control has changed in institutional structure, and as new control techniques have been developed and replaced, to a degree, older methods. All of this has
occupied a number of decades, in some cases predating any records
which can be used for measurement. Some of the techniques have
been used in combination. Overall, the data are too confounded,
or wanting, to enable evaluation of any but a few aspects of the
total problem. Yet, one or two generalizations can tentatively
be drawn.
Coyote control has taken place under private, state and
federal sponsorship. Some western ranchers employ their own
trappers to conduct control operations on their lands, or in some
cases public land. Sport hunting and fur trapping also contribute
to what must be considered private control operations. State departments of agriculture and state bounties give impetus to control
at the state lr vel. Except perhaps for bounty and some state
records, no da ta exist on the nature and magnitude of this complex
variety of efforts, and it is impossible to evaluate its influence.
The federal effort, on the other hand, has been documented
as described above. And since this has been the largest and
most systematic control effort in most states, an evaluation of its
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effects is tantamount to an evaluation of coyote control as largely
practiced in most states.
A number of recent publications (cf. Evanson, 1967; McNulty, 1971; Olsen, 1971) as well as the Cain Report have reviewed
the history of federal predator control, and that history need not
be repeated here. Suffice it to say that, since its institutionalization in the early part of this century, the effort has annually entailed a full force of men in each of the western states up to the
present. For example, in fiscal 1971, the equivalent of about 54
men were employed in Wyoming, 48 in Colorado, and 30 in Utah.
Although some recent critics have charged that the Division
of Predator and Rodent Control and its successor the Division of
Wildlife Services, has been an aggressively expanding organization
owing to its own self-promoting activities, the Division's records
do not bear out this contention, as the Cain Report clearly showed.
There has been some state-to-state variation, but in general the
number of men employed by the Division has declined steadily
from around 1,500 men in the early 1940's to the approximate
600 field men employed today (Cain et aI., 1972). It is true that
the expenditures for the Division have risen steadily over this same
period from about $2.7 million to about $8 million. But this increase has largely gone into salary increases and increased operating costs that have characterized all sectors of the economy
during the period.
Four basic methods are used in coyote control, each with some
variation in the manner or form in which it is used: (1) trapping,
(2) "denning," (3) shooting, and (4) poisoning. Trapping, of
course, involves the use of steel traps baited with various scents
or the carcasses of dead animals.
Denning is a spring operation in which coyote dens are located
on foot, on horseback, or from the air during the breeding season.
Once located, they are dug out and the pups destroyed. In recent
years, carbon monoxide cartridges are ignited, tossed into the den
which is then covered with dirt, and the pups asphyxiated.
Shooting is a year-round technique. Coyotes are shot during
chance encounters by field men, or they are lured within shooting
range by different calling techniques. They are also shot from the
air, especially in winter.
Several toxicants have been used. One of the oldest is strychnine which is impregnated into small suet or tallow balls known
as "drop baits." The "coyote-getter" is a small pipe imbedded in
16

the ground, and equipped with a trigger release which fires a pistol
cartridge. The cartridge is loaded with cyanide crystals which
are fired into the mouth of the coyote which trips the trigger. The
animal is attracted to the device by a scent placed on it. The
newer, spring-ejected "M-44" is less hazardous to humans and has
substantially replaced the "getter." Two highly lethal toxic
agents - sodium monofluoracetate, or "1080," and thallium are spread upon or impregnated into portions of a sheep or other
animal carcass and placed for animals to feed upon during winter.
The use chronology of these techniques has varied. Prior to
the early 1940's the major techniques were trapping, shooting, denning, and "drop baits." The coyote getter was developed in the
early 1940's and was immediately put to widespread use. Thallium
and 1080 appeared in the latter years of the decade. Thallium
was soon abandoned in most states because of its high toxicity
and nonselectivity. But 1080, which is more toxic to Canidae than
other animals, has persisted to the present as a bread-and-butter
control technique.
In the view of professional control personnel, shooting and
denning are the only techniques which are totally selective for
coyotes. Traps, thallium, and strychnine are least selective, while
coyote getters and 1080 are intermediate in selectivity. The latter
gains its selectivity not only because of its canid selectivity;
but also because 1080 baits are placed, one per township, to attract the wide ranging coyote but avoid attracting a major portion
of the other, less mobile animals in the landscape. And its use
only in the winter protects hibernating and migrating species.
These control methods are variously used for two basic strategies. The first is general population reduction on the premise
that sheep losses are some function of general coyote population
density and if that density is reduced, sheep losses will be reduced.
The second strategy is that' of apprehending specific, offending
animals. A pair of coyotes may den near a lambing ground, and
begin regular killing of lambs. If they can be apprehended, or
the den destroyed, the depredations cease.
Perhaps the only control method used almost exclusively for
one of the strategies is 1080. Placed in township-square networks
over major portions of a state, and out only in winter, this method
is used almost entirely as a population depressant.
Traps today are used primarily to apprehend offending animals. However, prior to the 1950's, huge numbers of traps were
set over the landscape in what essentially was aimed at population
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reduction. Shooting, too, is used for both purposes. Some workers
comb large regions by air in winter for population reduction. But
offending animals around lambing grounds are sometimes hunted
and' destroyed from the air. Denning also serves the same dual use.
Coyote getters and drop baits are used more as population
depressants. But at times they may be concentrated early in the
year in areas that will be used for lambing grounds in order to reduce later lamb kills in such areas. This type of concentrated,
preventive use approaches the trouble-shooting strategy.
In general, the trend over the years in the Division's efforts
has been toward greater specificity for coyote control in the reo
duction of trap and getter use, in the increased effort spent in
denning and shooting, and in the heavy relifince on 1080. That
reliance has simply come with the reduction of other techniques,
and not through any increase in 1080 use. Contrary to the charges
of recent critics, the level of 1080 use was relatively constant
between the dates of its initial use in the 1940's and the mid to late
1960's (Cain et aI., 1972). In the last few years, there has been
an actual reduction in 1080 use.
One exception to the increased specificity has been the
periodic, heavy use of strychnine. In the three states of Utah,
Colorado, and Wyoming, drop baits were heavily used in the
1940's, were used to a much lesser extent in the 1950's, then once
again gained attention in the 1960's (Cain et aI., 1972).
FINDINGS
EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROL IN REDUCING
COYOTE NUMBERS

Response of Animal Populations to Exploitation. - The
sincere, and well intentioned concern on both sides of the predatorcontrol controversy is producing a large number of assertions about
the effects of control on coyote populations which are not based
on adequate evidence or do not take into account the way in which
animal populations function. Some stockmen and trappers assume
that the removal of virtually any numbers of animals will reduce
the populations and ameliorate livestock losses. On the other side
of the question, some critics of control enumerate the numbers of
animals taken by the Division of Wildlife Services annually,
photograph dead coyotes hanging on fences, and conclude that
the survival of the species is endangered in many, if not most,
areas.
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The basic problem on both sides of the question is two-fold.
It is first a lack of any quantitative or statistical appraisal of the
situation over the vast reaches of western United States. The
evidence marshalled on both sides has been largely episodic and
localized. And the problem, secondly, is a failure to take into
account the population processes which characterize most animal
species, and by which they absorb exploitive removal.
To begin with, the coyote is a common and ubiquitous animal
in western United States. By comparison, the number of control
personnel is small over these large states. For example, the number
of personnel in Utah in recent years has numbered around 34 per
year. The area of the state is 82,000 square miles. By comparison
with the number of control personnel, · the number of hunters in
the state who kill small game and deer exceeds 100,000.
It is impossible to determine precisely what the impact of
control is upon the Utah coyote populations, but several figures
are instructive. Clark (1972) estimated somewhere between 200
and 500 coyotes annually on his 700-square-mile study area on the
Utah-Idaho border in the late 1960's and 1970's. The population
was at its lowest density among the years of the study in 1968,
and increased each succeeding year. Hence, the higher value is
perhaps realistic for 1970, but let us conservatively estimate 350 in
that year, · or one coyote per two square miles. This may well be
conservative as it is at the lower extreme of the commonly cited
coyote densities for North America (Knowlton, 1972). One per
square mile is not an unusual density.

The Utah portion of the study area is in Box Elder County,
a county of some 5,600 square miles. If the county-wide densities were similar to those of Clark's study area - and this seems
reasonable on the basis of our knowledge of the area - the
coyotes in Box Elder County may have numbered a conservative
2,800 in 1970. In fiscal 1971, hunters presented 563 Box Elder
County coyotes for the $6 bounty paid by the State. In the same
year, Division of Wildlife Services personnel reported killing 180
animals in the county. The total of the two figures is 743, or about
one fourth of the estimated population size.
It is quite probable that not all of the coyotes killed by nonDivision personnel were bountied. Arid Division kill estimates are
conservative because a good proportion of the coyotes killed by
1080 are never retrieved. Hence, 743 may underestimate the
number killed by human activities. However, our population estimate may also be conservative and hence the 25 percent value
may remain as a reasonable estimate of the proportion killed. In
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1968, the kill was lower with 155 bountied, 120 taken by Division
personnel, and the combined values totaling 275.
Over the state as a whole, the picture is similar. It would of
course not be valid to assume a comparable mean density over the
state similar to that in Curlew Valley, although 96 percent of the
state area is uncultivated desert and mountain terrain as in the
Valley. Yet, it seems entirely possible that there are a very few
tens of thousands of coyotes in the 82,000-square-mile state. The
combined bounty (4,400) and Division kill (3,388) total 7,828
for 1971, and are probably a limited fraction of the statewide
population.
What might be the effect of an annual removal of perhaps
25.-30 percent of the animals on the coyote population? The average coyote litter size is about six young in Utah, and under good
food conditions and low densities, most of the first-year females
may breed (Clark, 1972). The result is that the species is capable
of nearly quadrupling its numbers each year through reproduction.
This is a high rate of increase similar to that of many small birds
and mammals. Clearly, the species must sustain a high annual
mortality rate to prevent it from increasing indefinitely. F. W.
Clark's data (unpublished) suggest a mean, annual mortality
rate of somewhere near 60-65 percent per year in northern Utah.
Knowlton's (1972) data suggest comparable rates, even in areas
where no artificial control is carried on.
Clearly, the species is constituted to absorb large losses and
maintain itself through reproduction. ,Furthermore, nearly every
animal species-and Knowlton's (1972) data suggest this for the
coyote - possesses some degree of population resilience by virtue
of density-dependent responses in reproductive and mortality
patterns. As a species incurs heavy losses and suffers some popul~tion reduction, other sources of mortality ease their impact,
and/or reproductive rates increase, and the species strikes a new
equilibrium with which it absorbs the new cause of mortality.
This is not to say that a species cannot be overexploited and
extirpated. But, it does not necessarily follow that, because large
numbers of animals are killed, the species is endangered or its
numbers materially reduced. It is density-dependent population
responses such as those described which make it possible for man
to remove a sustained yield over a long period of time through
sport hunting and fishing, or commercial fishing. And it is in this
way that a prey species in a primeval situation can withstand
continued removal of individuals by a predatory species without
its survival being seriously imperilled or numbers greatly altered.
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The coyote is a ubiquitous species with a high reproductive
rate, distributed over a vast region of North America. We cannot
easily deduce the effects of control measures from the numbers
of animals taken by control agents, or from the sight of a few
dozen or few hundred dead coyotes. The need, once again, is for
experimentation.
Effects of Control Prior to the 1930's. - There appears little
doubt, on the basis of historical records summarized by Dobie
(1950), that coyotes were a very abundant animal in primeval
North America. They continued at relatively high numbers around
the turn of the 20th century, judging by reports summarized in
Palmer (1897: 45) and Seton (1929), although Seton suggests that
by this time they had been hunted to the point of some reduction.

There are few long-term records which help to depict the
trends in the early part of the present century up to the time of
institutionalized predator control in the 1930's or 1940's. One
perhaps instructive series of data is that reported by Keith (1963:
167), who summarized fur returns of trappers in the three Prairie
Provinces of Canada. These show strong, annual catches starting
in 1919 and continuing, but perhaps in slightly declining numbers,
to the middle 1940's, and generally dwindling at a more rapid
rate thereafter to about 10 percent of the earlier catches. While
this decline may in part be attributable to the decline in fur
value, its severity might suggest some population decline.
The widespread impression exists that the species was less
numerous by the 1930's and 40's than in earlier times. Few people
alive today have witnessed anything like the primeval numbers
described by Dobie (1950). Yet, it is still an abundant and widely
distributed animal in many areas, and has extended its range in
North America during this century to a number of previously unoccupied areas (Seton, 1929; Goldman, 1933). On the whole, it is
nearly impossible to separate the relative roles of artificial control,
and the profound land changes that have taken place on the continent in the last century and a half, in affecting coyote numbers.
Effects of Control Since the 1930's. - Some aspects of coyote
control can be tentatively evaluated for the period of the 1930's to
t he present for two reasons: (1) The Division of Wildlife Services
records are fairly continuous through this period and provide a
basis for measurement. (2) The newer toxicants - 1080 and
coyote getters - were introduced in the 1940's. The years preceding the introduction of these methods can thus be considered
as a pre-experimental control period, while the years follo,wing
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their introduction can be considered the period in which the
coyote-control variable is manipulated. It is not possible with
available data to evaluate the effects of trapping, shooting, and
denning because these have been in use throughout the period for
which we have coyote population measurements. There is no way
of separating out control and experimental periods.
Coyotes-killed-per-man-year indices are shown in Figures 2a
and 2b. The first generalization to be drawn from these figures
is the short-term variability of coyote populations. Coyote numbers
rise and fall at somewhere around 10- to l5-year intervals. Clark
(1972) and Wagner (1972) observed short-term fluctuations in
Curlew Valley and postulated that these were related to variations
in numbers of the major dietary animal in the area, the blacktailed jackrabbit. Gier (196B) observed annual changes in coyote
reproductive rate with variations in the rodent populations of
that area. And Keith (1963) documented widespread 10-year
periodicities in coyote numbers in the Canadian Prairie Provinces
which have been attributed by some observers to variations in
snowshoe hare populations, but by others to unknown cyclic influences.
Whatever the source of the changes, they take place during
periods of fairly constant control effort in the United States, and
in the absence of control in Canada. Consequently, they cannot
be attributed to control efforts, or the lack thereof.
A more promising approach is to calculate mean, annual
population (index) levels for the pre- and post-lOBO and "getter"
periods, and determine whether the average population densities
have been lower during the era of lOBO use than in the preceding
period. These averages are shown in Table 1. In some states,
primarily the more northerly ones, the mean population density
appears to have been lower than in the pre-lOBO era. However,
in the more southerly states there appears to have been little
difference in population density in the two periods.
Division of Wildlife Services personnel contend that lOBO is
a more effective control measure in the northern states than in
the southern. In the north, the severity of winter weather causes
food shortage for a coyote at a time when lower temperatures
create a greater food need. The animals may move around more in
search of food, and increase the chances of their contacting a lOBO
bait station. Shortage of natural food forces them to utilize the
poison-impregnated carrion of the station. In the southern states,
milder climates and a greater abundance of food in the form of
plant fruits and greater faunal diversity (Wagner, 1971) may
24

TABLE I-Comparison of Mean, Annual Population Indices for
Years Previous to, and During, the Use of 1080 Poison 1

State

Montana
Wyoming
Idaho
Utah
Nevada
Colorado
Arizona
New Mexico
Texas

Mean, Annual No. Coyotes
Taken Per Man-Year of Effort
% Change Between
Pre-1080
lOBO Period pre-lOBO and lOBO Means

156
178
196
128
216
184
155
83
153

48
86
102
66
167
134
116
106
149

-69
-52
-48
-48
-23
-27
-23
+29
-3

lSee text for calculation of coyotes-per-man-year index based on records
of the Division of Wildlife Services. The indices are not comparable between
states because the number of men employed by the Division, the coyote
populations, and the extent to which different · control techniques are used
vary between states.

reduce the need for extensive movement and provide an adequacy
of natural foods.
All of this may be the case, but there has also been less 1080
used in the southern states, perhaps because of its lower effectiveness, as Division records show. When the extent of 1080 used is
compared with the degree of pre- and post-1080 population change
shown in Table 1, the evidence is rather strongly suggestive that
1080 is an effective population depressant when used in substantial amounts (Figure 2).
This raises some suspicion in my own mind as to the effectiveness of any of the other control measures. Texas has used comparatively little 1080, but has compensated with far heavier getter
use than other states. Yet, the populations of 1950's to 60's have
been essentially similar to those of the pre-getter era. Other measures are difficult to evaluate. Doubtless any technique, if applied
intensively enough, would reduce population levels. But the question is whether or not the techniques other than 1080, as presently
used, have any material effect. There is no unequivocal answer
available.
Security of Coyotes as a Species. - Critics of predator control
sometimes fear that control has brought the species to the brink
of extinction, or at least placed it on the endangered list. As th~
evidence in Figures 2 and 3 suggests, there is some question that
the control efforts of the past four decades have materially influenced numbers in some areas. Indeed, the Cain Report (Cain,
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et aI., 1972) pointed out that as many coyotes have been taken
over the country in recent years by the Division of Wildlife Services
as were being taken 30 to 40 years ago, and suggested that the
net effect of control might be that of a sustained-yield removal with
little impact on population levels.
Even in such states as Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah, where
there is some evidence of post-lOBO reduction, that reduction may
be no more than half the pre-lOBO density. Since the reduction,
it would appear that the populations have achieved a new equili-
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brium and are fluctuating within new limits at these lower densities.
It seems likely that the currently used control techniques
will decline in effectiveness as time passes. Division trappers claim
that the effectiveness of coyote-getters declined within a decade
or so after their introduction, possibly because the animals learned
to avoid them. Similarly, 1080 may select an increasingly resistant
gene pool much as other biocides have done with other species.
Division personnel decry the fact that coyotes too often will not
use a 1080 bait, especially if natural foods are available. The
implication of this might be a learning process.

On the whole, the coyote is an extremely adaptable, flexible,
and ubiquitous species in western United States. It inhabits a
wide variety of environments from the tops of mountain ranges
(including winter) to the bottoms of the deserts, and most intervening types. It flourishes on the fringe of agricultural areas,
and has moved into the suburban areas of a number of cities. There
is evidence that control has affected its numbers in some areas, primarily the more northerly states. But this effect may be less
extreme than profound land changes of spreading urbanization and
cultivation. There is reason to believe (cf. Clark, 1972; Wagner,
1971; Frederick Knowlton, Unpub.) that food availability and
quantity may be a more important determinant of density than
human control measures in some areas, and in general food availability is probably an important ingredient in coyote numbers in
all areas. Clark (1972) and Wagner (1971) concluded that if
more food were available in their Utah-Idaho study area, coyotes
would be more numerous even in the face of existing control
measures.

Coyote Increases of the Early 1970's. - As this is written in
early 1972, there is a great deal of concern among stockmen over
the evident increases in coyote numbers of the past two to three
years. In implementing the recommendations of the Leopold Report (Leopold et aI., 1964), the Division of Wildlife Services reduced to some degree the amount of 1080 used (cf. Cain et aI.,
1972), and restricted coyote control in areas where there is little
sheep grazing. The fear is that this easing of control activities
has led to the recent coyote increases. The view is shared by
many Division personnel.
While one cannot rule out the possibility that the reduction
in 1080 use may be partly responsible, it does not seem likely that
this is the entire, or even the main, influence. The Utah coyote
population had declined from 1964 through 1967 (Figure 2a) - a
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period in which the amount of lOBO used had been constant,
and obviously this decline did not relate to any change in lOBO
use. Rather, the decline was probably one of the naturally occuring
fluctuations that characterize coyote populations as described
above.
Similar population declines (Figure 2a) had occurred in Utah
between 1943 and 1947 (note that lOBO was first used in the state
in 194B), and between 1953 and 195B (when lOBO use was constant). Following each of these declines, the population increased
again as oscillating populations characteristically do. The increases
occurred in the face of lOBO use, as the present increase is doing
even if the lOBO use has been reduced by one-third.
It seems entirely possible that the present coyote increase
is part of the natural fluctuation pattern. And if it is, we can
probably look for another decline period within a few years, say
two to four. The effect of reduced lOBO use will more likely be a
slight increase in the range of densities through which the population fluctuates over a period of years. Figure 3 would suggest that,
if lOBO use continues for a period of years at a level of about 1200
stations, as in 1969 and 1970, the mean coyote population level
would be about 40 percent lower than the pre-lOBO period instead
of the 50 percent reduction that has characterized the 1949 to 1971
period.
PATTERN OF SHEEP

Loss AND

EFFECTS OF CONTROL

The basic questions for which we need allilwers are about
three-fold under this topic: (1) What is the magnitude of sheep
losses to predation? (2) How does that magnitude relate to coyote
abundance? (3) How is the magnitude influenced by coyote
control? Answers to these questions again fall back on the problems of measurement. Questions (2) and (3) can be answered to
some degree by biased estimates of losses, as long as the degree
of bias is constant, or by indices of losses much as we used indices
of coyote population density above to analyze the impact of control measures on coyote numbers. And once again, answers to
these questions require an experimental situation: manipulation of
the coyote-density variable, or of the predator-control variable, and
observation on the effect of this manipulation on sheep loss levels.
Question (1) requires accurate estimates of the number and
proportion of sheep lost to predation. Any analysis of loss economics, or of the cost-benefit economics of predator control, depends on accurate loss measurement. Such accuracy is difficult
to obtain, and most of the existing estimates are challenged by
opponents of predator control. The credibility problem lies in the
2B

fact that most of the existing estimates depend on interview data
from stockmen, and the judgment of the interviewee as to the cause
of death. As !s well known, sheep die from a variety of causes:
genetic birth defects, inadequate mother's milk, diseases and parasites of various kinds, accidents, inclement weather, toxic plants,
and predators. In addition, losses occur when animals stray from
flocks and when inadvertently left on summer range after removal
in fall.
Separating predator losses from among these is often difficult.
A lamb that died of birth defects or malnutrition, and was scavenged by predators, may appear to have been a predator kill.
Or a weakened animal that would have died from other causes,
might fall prey to a predator.
Another source of bias may be in the self-protective behavior
of some sheep herders and other employees. A herder who, through
lack of proper care, loses some animals may protect his position
by claiming that the animals were killed by predators. In addition,
it is conceivable that some ranchers may overestimate predator
losses under the influence of the present, heated predator-control
climate. Consequently, it is difficult not to assume some inflation
of nearly all interview data on sheep losses.
For the most part, the sheep industry has operated on faith
that predator control reduces sheep losses sufficiently to warrant
funds in excess of the $4 million which it expends annually on the
effort. That assumption needs to be examined in the light of evidence that control efforts may have little impact on coyote numbers in some areas, and because of the possible detrimental effects
of control.
Mg.gnitude of Sheep Losses. - The Nielson and Curle (1970)
study may provide the best estimate of sheep losses available because of the pains taken to minimize the biases. Based on a 20
percent sample of Utah sheep ranchers, these investigators gathered their data through personal contact and oral interview. Sheepmen were asked to estimate their total losses during fiscal 196B-69,
and using particular care, to report the number of sheep lost to
predators.
The results showed an average predator loss of 61 ewes and
lambs per 1,000 ewes. Since lamb losses made up about two-thirds
of the total, these data suggest about 20 ewes lost per thousand
ewes (or 2 percent) and about 40 lambs lost per thousand ewes.
Figures were not reported on the lamb crop but. based on typical
lamb-crop figures, it probably fell somewhere between BOO and
1,000 lambs per 1,000 ewes. On this basis, lamb loss approached
29

4 to 5 percent, and overall sheep losses approached 3 percent of
the flocks. Coyotes were reported as being the major cause of
predatory loss. It should be noted that this loss was estimated for
a single year in which statewide coyote numbers were relatively
low (Figures 1 and 2).
The Crop and Livestock Reporting Service estimates summarized by Reynolds and Gustad (1971) were based on a mailed
questionnaire to a sample of stockmen in four western states.
The estimates from this poll varied between 3.6 and 7.9 percent
loss of sheep to predators in different states and different years.
Once again, coyotes were reported as being the major offender.
The Morris estimates described above produced loss figures
that ranged mostly between 7 and 10 percent prior to the 1940's.
From the late 1940's to the mid 1960's, after which Morris retired,
predator losses were estimated to fall mostly between 2 and 4 percent. This agrees very closely with the Nielson-Curle estimates.
The Forest Service estimates for the level of predator losses
occuring during the summer grazing season on the National Forests
range between 0.4 and 1.5 percent. Nielson and Curle found the
heaviest losses occuring on the lambing grounds and on the winter
ranges in Utah. Hence the Forest Service estimates are in accord
with the Nielson-Curle estimates in that the former takes place
between these two seasons of heaviest loss, and for a period of
perhaps no more than about 4 months out of the year.
Except for the Reynolds and Gustad (1971) study, the Crop
and Livestock Reporting Service estimates only the magnitude of
losses due to all causes. Predator losses are not asked for on their
questionnaires or estimated separately. However, these estimates
are of value because they place an upper limit on predator loss since
the latter obviously cannot exceed the total. And since sheep die
from a variety of causes, it must be true that the losses due to
predators lie to some unknown degree below the total-loss rates.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, these total-loss estimates may
be the most reliable estimates we have because they involve no
interpretation of the cause of death. They require only that the
rancher have a reasonably accurate count of his first-of-the-year
inventory, his lamb crop, the number of lambs he sells during the
year, and his year-end inventory. The difference between these
values must be the total losses due to all causes.
A word is in order as to how the percentages were estimated
for this report. At the suggestion of Grant Lea, the number of
"stock" sheep, as reported in the Statistical Reporting Service's
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annual summary entitled "Livestock and Poultry," was used as the
number of breeder sheep in the calculations in order to avoid
counting feeder lambs (the latter are included in the first-of-the
year "total" sheep counts) because these lambs are kept in feed
lots and have little exposure to predation. To the number of "stock
sheep" was added the item termed "lambs saved" in the annual
publications from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics for each
year in each state. This is the number of lambs docked. Docking
takes place some time after lambing-e.g. , as much as two months
in Texas. Hence use of the docking count to estimate lamb losses
gives no provision for losses between lambing and docking. The
sum of "stock sheep" and "lambs saved" was taken as the total
number of sheep for the beginning of each year, and this sum was
divided into the sum of the two values "sheep deaths" and "lamb
deaths. " This provided a yearly estimate for each state of the
percentage of "stock sheep" and lambs lost during the year to all
causes.
These annual percentages were then averaged for the period
1924 to 1970 for nine western states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Utah and Wyoming). The
percentages are remarkably constant over the years, and between
states. The lowest state was Idaho at 7.9 percent, and the highest
Nevada at 11.3. All of the others fell between 8.5 and 10.6. Predator losses on the average, must therefore be some unknown degree
less than about 8 to 11 percent in these states, on the average.
In light of this, Morris's estimates of 7 to 10 percent prior to the
late 1940's . seem improbable, and this may cast some doubt on
the accuracy of the later, but lower, estimates.

Statistical Distribution of Losses. - One cannot meet with
stockmen's groups on the subject of predator control without hearing a number of these sincere and forthright men attest to heavy
predator losses. Yet the growing evidence seems to point in many
cases to the conclusion that such losses, on the average, are relatively light. This seeming paradox can perhaps be resolved by a
look at the frequency distribution of the losses.
The only raw data avaliable were those generously provided
by Dr. Nielson which were obtained in the Nielson and Curle
(1970) study. These are shown in Figure 4, and may resolve the
question. The majority of ranchers in Nielson's and Curle's sample
experienced relatively light losses: 80 percent of this sample sustained losses of 50 ewes and lambs per 1,000 ewes or less. If we
use the same formula for converting these to percentages as used
above, four-fifths of the ranchers sustained predator losses of 2.5
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percent or less in Utah in 1968-69. Only 20 percent sustained
losses in the higher range. If this is a typical, annual distribution,
then some ranchers will sustain heavy losses each year. On the
basis of these results, they will be a minority, percentagewise.
But the number of sheepmen in Utah must approximate 300 to 400.
Twenty percent of that total is 60 to 80, and in any group there
will always be a number of individuals who have had sizeable
losses.

Effectiveness of Control in Reducing Sheep Losses. - As
discussed above, coyote-control activities potentially can reduce
sheep losses in two ways: (1) In the trouble-shooting type of
control where a coyote preying on a flock is apprehended, and (2)
in the general population reduction of coyotes on the assumption
that the level of sheep losses is some function of coyote density.
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Division of Wildlife Services personnel are repeatedly confronted
with situations in which one or a few coyotes prey upon a sheep
flock. When these offending animals are removed, the losses stop
and there seems little question that control has, in these instances,
reduced the level of loss that would have been experienced without
apprehension of the offenders.
Yet, the effectiveness of this mode of reduction is almost impossible to measure. The real question we wish to ask is the
extent to which losses are reduced with trouble-shooting control
below what they would be without that kind of control. No one
would advocate that control be withheld and that losses be allowed to continue in order to provide the "with" and "without"
measurements. Hence, the evidence is not at hand to evaluate
trouble-shooting control quantitatively.
Some tentative indications can be gained on the contribution
of population control. The cyclic rises and falls of coyote populations, as well as generalized reduction through control efforts, constitute de facto experiments. For one can measure sheep losses
as coyote densities vary and determine whether or not, and to
what extent, sheep losses vary.
The various predator-loss figures of the Division of Wildlife
Services, including the Morris estimates, and those of the Forest
Service are plotted over time in Figure 5 for Utah, Wyoming, and
Colorado. All of these sources of data suggest a reduction in the
level of sheep predatory losses, whatever their true magnitude,
in the late 1940's. This reduction coincides with the decline in
coyote numbers in these states at about the same time (Figure 2).
The Morris data suggest a reduction of sheep predatory losses
in the late 1940's roughly similar in magnitude to the reduction in
Utah coyote populations: i.e., somewhere near one-half or more.
Hence, if abandoning 1080 use and whatever else promoted the
1949-50 decline enabled the coyote population to return to the
level of the early 1940's, Utah sheep predatory losses, whatever
their true magnitude, might increase by a factor of two or more.
These combined sets of data suggest that there is a correlation
between coyote population density and the level of sheep losses.
And it follows that generalized coyote population reduction does
appear, at least on the basis of these data, to reduce the level of
sheep predatory losses.
The remaining set of data to be examined is the Crop and
Livestock Reporting Service annual estimates of total loss that
were described above. In the final analysis, it is the degree to
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Predation Losses of Sheep in Three States Reported by Division of Wildlife
Services and U.S. Forest Service (See Text for Sources).
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TABLE 2-Mean, Annual Percentage of Sheep Dying from all
Causes Previous to, and During, the Use of lOBO Poison'
State

Mean, Annual Percent of Sheep Lost
1924-39
1940-49
1950-70

Montana _____ __ ____________ ___________________ ___ __ ___ __ B.5
Wyoming ___ __ ____ ____ ____ __ ___ _____ ______ ___ ____________ 9.1
Idaho __ ________ __ _____ ___ ______ ____ __ ___ ___ _____ ___ __ ____ __ B.6
Utah __ ___ __ ____ __ ____ __ ______ ___________ __ ____ __._______ __ 10.9
Nevada _____ _____ _______ __ __________ __ ______ ____ ____ _____ 12.2
Colorado _____________ ____ _____ ______ ______ ____ ___ _______ 10.2
Arizona ____ ___ __ _____ __________ ____ ____ ______ ____ _____ ___ 10.3
New Mexico _____________ ___ ___ _________ ____ ______ ____ 10.9
Texas _______ ____________ _____ _____ __ ________ ___ ______ ____ __ 9.4
Mean _________________________ ___ __ ______ ___ ___ __ ____ __ ____ 10.0

8.4
7.9
8.4
11.1
11.7
9.4
8.6
10.5.
10.3
9.6

10.3
B.4

7.0
9.4
10.3
9.1
7.9
10.B

11.3
' 9.4

' The percentages are calculated from the records of the U.S_D .A_ Crop
and Livestock Reporting Service_ The 1940-49 is considered to be the decade
immediately preceding widespread, general 1080 use. The substance has
been in general use throughout the 1950-70 period.

which predator-control operations reduce total losses that they
make their economic contributions. We discussed above the possibility that biases may enter into the estimates of predatory losses,
but that the total-loss estimates may be free of these biases.
We saw that predatory loss estimates appear to vary with coyote
density and control activities, but if these estimates do prove to be
substantially biased, it is conceivable that total-loss estimates are
not correlated with coyote numbers.
Annual, total-loss rates for nine western states are summarized
in Table 2, and are averaged for the periods 1924-1939, 1940-1949,
and 1950-1970. There are uncertainties as to how uniform a set
of data that goes back nearly 50 years may be. Hence the breakdown between an early era, a 10-year period immediately prior
to lOBO use, and a 21-year period during which lOBO has had
continuous use.
These results show little, if any, change in the level of sheep
lost between the 1940's, and the lOBO period. Among the more
northerly states in which some reduction in coyote numbers w~s
suggested in Figure 2, three showed; some reduction in losses
(Idaho, Utah, Nevada), two showed increase (Montana, Wyoming), and one showed essentially no change (Colorado). Among
the southern states which showed little change in post-lOBO
coyote numbers, one state showed decrease (Arizona), one no
change (New Mexico), and one showed increase (Texas). Grouped
together, they suggest little if any change in sheep losses.
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Those which do show a reduction only experienced a reduction of
around one-and-a-half percent.
The loss rates are amazingly constant over the years, and in
those states in Figure 2 which suggested 2- to 3-fold fluctuations in
coyote numbers, there is no parallel change in annual percentage
of sheep lost to all causes.

General Discussion on Effectiveness of Control in Reducing
Sheep Losses. - There have now been completed a number of
coyote food-habits studies covering much of the western half of
the United States (cf. Clark, 1972; Ellis and Shemnitz, 1958;
Ferrel et al., 1953; Gier, 1968; Young 'and Jackson, 1951). None
of these has ever shown livestock to be a major part of the diet.
Coyotes characteristically feed primarily on rodent, rabbits, and
carrion, and in some areas on plant material.
But the opponents of coyote control cannot take encouragement in this fact alone, nor should the proponents take exception. It has been pointed out repeatedly that the frequency of a
prey item in the predator's diet - whether based on stomach
and scat analyses, remains around dens, or remains in nests of
raptors - is no criterion of the impact of predator on prey (cf.
Latham, 1950; Wagner et al., 1967). Rather, the important
criterion is the percentage of the prey population taken, and this
depends not only on the frequency of kill per predator, but also
on the numbers of both predators and prey.
To use the case of Utah sheep as an example, there were
roughly 1,700,000 sheep in the state in 1970. If there were
20,000 coyotes in the state in the same year, as seems entirely
possible, and each killed 3 sheep that year, the total kill of
60,000 would be roughly 3 percent of the total, the percentage
as calculated by Nielson and Curle (1970). Yet if the sheep meat
only appeared 3 days in each animal's diet, it appeared in less
than 1 percent of the 365 days in the year. A food-habits study
would find sheep remains to be an extremely rare dietary item.
The problem is to determine the percentage of sheep killed by
coyotes, and the degree to which coyote population control measures affect this percentage. There is no evidence available to assess
the degree to which pre-lOBO control measures reduced coyote
populations. One cannot avoid the suspicion that measures other
than toxicants are of limited effectiveness-indeed there is some
indication that toxicants themselves have limited effectiveness in
some areas - but this is largely speculation. The evidence does
suggest that lOBO achieved some measure of population reduction
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in some states. And there is some evidence that sheep predatory
losses are correlated with coyote population density. Hence, any
reduction in coyote populations would occasion reduction in sheep
predatory losses.
Yet, the evidence on total sheep losses shows little, if any,
correlation with coyote population density and the use of control
measures which reduce that density. Several explanatins can be
suggested to explain this paradox: (1) One or both sets of data
may have inherent statistical biases which render the comparison
invalid. (2) The true level of sheep predatory losses may be so
low that cutting it in half does not materially change the level of
total losses. (3) The predatory and non-predatory losses are
somewhat compensatory. For example, coyotes may often take
sheep which would die anyway due to sickness, malnutrition, or
other causes. The result is that the loss level would be much the
same with or without predatory loss. There is almost certainly
some degree of competing probability among the various causes
of loss. Obviously, some animals saved from one cause of death
will die from another.
There is no basis for selecting from among these alternatives
at present. Truth may consist of some combination of them. They
do, however, introduce a good deal of uncertainty as to what the
true picture is. And they raise a valid question as to just how
important predatory losses are, and how much value is derived
from generalized coyote population control.
EFFECTS OF CONTROL ON OTHER ANIMALS IN THE
ECOSYSTEM

The two most likely ways in which coyote control activities
might affect other animals in the ecosystem are (1) by direct,
inadvertent reduction of nontarget species, especially carnivores,
which are caught or poisoned by devices placed over the landscape
for coyotes; and (2) by the increase of prey species formerly held
in check by coyote predation (or predation of other carnivores
inadvertently reduced by coyote control). In both of these cases,
an experimental perspective is again in order: (1) What were the
densities of nontarget carnivores before and after institution of control measures? (2) What are prey animal densities at different
coyote population levels, and therefore different predation levels of
coyotes?
Here again it is important that we maintain a population
perspective. In their well-placed concern for our fauna, opponents
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of predator control have noted with alarm that some nontarget
animals have been found dead in the vicinity of 1080 stations.
And some advocates of control have pointed to the desirable
animals killed by coyotes. But as we have seen above in the case
of the coyote, one cannot judge the effect on a species from the
loss of some individuals. A quantitative overview is essential for
an understanding of what is happening to a species.
Effects on Nontarge.t Carnzvores. - The Division of Wildlife
Services has kept annual records of the number of carnivorous
mammals of different species which they have taken inadvertently
each year during the course of predator-control operations. These
can be calculated on a predators-taken-per-man-year basis, as in
the way we treated the coyote data above.

The animals are largely taken in traps set for coyotes, and
variations in the degrees to which traps have been used poses
a bias. There has been a gradual reduction of trap use over the
past few decades, and a very abrupt reduction in the last 10 years.
Thus, in Utah the Division used 4,026 traps in 1961, and 1,572 in
1970, a reduction of nearly two thirds. Hence, this source of bias
must be borne in mind in interpreting the results. And again as
in the case of the coyote, the early predator-control measures
of trapping, using strychnine, and some shooting developed gradually before records were available to evaluate the effects. Hence,
our attention must be turned largely to the pre-1080 and 1080
years for which we have "before" and "after" data, and which
serve as the cont rol and experimental phases of our experiment.
The number of animals caught per man-year of effort for
several species (Figure 6) shows a strong increase in Utah and
Wyoming in t he late 1940's at about the time 1080 was first used
and coyote populations were declining (Figure 2) . These are
states with heavy 1080 use (Figure 3). Montana and Colorado
data show the same pattern, as do Nevada and Idaho data for
bobcat. Nevada data for other species are incomplete, while Idaho
data do not show similar trends for other carnivores.
The increasing catch for these species would seem to imply
population increase, contrary to the claims of many authors that
their numbers are being reduced by predator control. Indeed, since
the period shown in Figure 6 was one of declining trap use, the true
extent to which these species increased may be underestimated.
The sharp decline in catch in tlie 1960's coincides with the abrupt
reduction in trap use described above.
These cases bear out a frequent claim made by Division
personnel that reduction of one carnivorous species in an area

38

x

Ie

u.
0::

I
I

0

0::

«

50

UJ
~
I

~

zcs:
«u

20 0
0::

ILl
(!)

0

~~

0::

III 25

BOBCAT

ct

10

UJ

a..

~
,

' . ..J

~
~

~

co

<i

fr50
~o::

zo
«
,~

~ ~25

I

ct

I

III

I,. ~ ;

ILl

BADGER

0::

I

(!)

25

10~
III

. .

ITEXAS

ARIZONA
;.

1080

.

~

.....

! -~
". ;.:

0

:1

'.

'~.i:' i/---~-4 •
1950

i'
B~DGER:r: ~

I<

~

50

;' .~...

1940

0

J. :'.
I
.' :'. :
~.: ...

BOBCAT

,

0

,w:.,
. .:
FOX

I

IBOBCAT
"t

u.
20
0::

u

III

~\;~ IF_2~J/-:
l\ :

III

50

I-

I

~10

~

x

Jc
8

1080

IE

0

I

C/)x

WYOMING

•

1080

BADGER

III

Z

UTAH

u.
200::

5

0

0

ILl

III

(!)

25

10~
III

BOBCAT

"I

---'V-

..A.I

1960

1970

1080-i\

I
I FOX~::":

0::

III

:.

'.

'.

.... .. .. ....... ..... .

1940

::BADGE~~

1950

~I

............... ~

1960

1970

Figure 6,
Annual Population Trends of Bobcats, Badgers, and Foxes in Two Northern and Two Southern States as Shown by
Animals-Taken-Per-Man-Year Indices from Division of Wildlife Services Records.

results in the increase of another. Thus, Owen Morris, former
Utah state director of the Division once told me that coyotes increased in the Intermountain West after elimination of the timber
wolf. Other trappers have told me that coyotes and bobcats frequently display reciprocal population fluctuations, and that red
foxes increased in the western parts of the Dakotas after reduction
in coyote numbers.
There are hints of the same phenomena in the literature.
Krefting (1970) reported the disappearance of coyotes on Isle
Royal following the arrival of timber wolves on the island, and D.
L. Allen (Personal Communication) has told me of evidence that
wolves kill foxes on the same island. Goldman (1933) reported
altercations between coyotes and foxes when the former spread
into Alaska in the early part of this century, and eventual decline
of foxes.
The implication seems to be that interspecific population
regulatory processes exist between these species in the same
trophic level, with perhaps the larger Canidae the more aggressive,
dominant forms. It is uncertain whether the interactions are
direct, aggressive ones, or whether they are based on competition
for a common food supply. Elsewhere (Wagner, 1969), I have
summarized a number of similar cases where heavy exploitation
and reduction of one animal species led to marked increases of
competitors which were not similarly exploited. And it is perhaps
significant that nontarget carnivorous species in two southern
states (Texas and Arizona), where coyote numbers may not have
been so markedly reduced, did not show the response which these
species showed in the northern states (Figure 6). Here again, the
evidence is not unequivocal. Nontarget carnivores in New Mexico
did seem to undergo increase similar to those in the northern states.
Whether or not the implied increases of these carnivores have
been due to coyote reduction, or to other unknown influences, the
main point is that control activities directed at coyotes are not
seriously imperilling at least the species surveyed here. This would
tend to bear out the Division's contention that 1080 is substantially coyote specific because of its canid specificity, and because
of the wide distances at which the baits are placed which tend to
keep them away from many individuals of these relatively less
mobile species.
The point is not intended to disarm concern for endangered
species, or those for which we have no data. McNulty's (1971)
concern for the black-footed ferret's plight is certainly well taken,
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as is the concern of Leopold et aI., (1964) for the Sierra del Nido
grizzly bear. And the fact that 1080 should have been placed
within the cruising radius of the few remaining California condors
(Leopold et aI., 1964) is inconceivable. But with the exception
of such species, the evidence does not point to the profound effects
of 1080 use on non-target species that is sometimes feared. We
have seen that, in some states, the evidence even raises the question as to whether the target species, the coyote, is materially
influenced.
One species for which there is concern in recent years is the
kit fox, and its apparent decline in numbers is charged against predator control. This may be true, but as data like the ones unearthed in this study repeatedly produce results contrary to prevailing impression - the seeming lack of impact of control on
southern coyote populations, the seeming lack of correlation
between coyote numbers and total sheep losses, and the seeming
increase of nontarget carnivores which supposedly are being reduced by the use of poisons - one finds it difficult not to withhold judgment on such claims until critical evidence is at hand.
Our land is experiencing profound changes from a variety of
human influences. If a species like the kit fox has declined, it is
perhaps too easy to ascribe the change to some unpopular scapegoat like predator control when in fact the decline may be due to
far more pervasive and subtle changes in the ecosystem. The kit
fox is primarily a denison of southern deserts. As we have seen
above, the amount p-of 1080 used in these areas is rather low by
comparison with states farther north.

Effects on Big Game Animals. - One of the justifications
commonly cited by advocates of predator control is that populations of big game species are increased by the reduction of large
predators. Indeed in an early, milestone paper, Leopold et aI. ,
(1947) pointed out the widespread tendency for deer populations
in North America to increase sharply during this century, and
ascribed these eruptions to the triumverate of habitat change,
protective laws, and removal of large carnivores. The Kaibab
Plateau deer eruption in Arizona (Rasmussen, 1941) has been
repeatedly cited ex post facto as the classical example of what
occurs in a deer population when the predatory checks are removed.
In several recent studies, evidence has been presented of the actual
limiting influence of large predators on ungulate populations (cf.
Mech, 1966; Hirst, 1969).
Yet, there probably are more studies which find predation
by large carnivores to have little impact on ungulate densities (cf.
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Leopold, 1955; Talbot and Talbot, 1963; Pimlott, 1967; Hornocker, 1970). And upon recent reanalysis of the available evidence, Caughley (1970) raised a serious question as to whether
removal of predators did play a significant role in the Kaibab
deer eruption. The basic problem is that in most cases of North
American deer eruptions, predation has not been the only variable
manipulated. The other, and perhaps more important, variable
has been the improvement of habitat and food supply: Cutting
and regrowth of mature forests in the East, and invasion of shrubby species into grazing lands in the western part of the continent.
The result is to create a considerable amount of uncertainty as
to the role of predators in limiting ungulate populations, especially
the versatile and fecund deer species.
Many Divisions of Wildlife Services personnel and some western game biologists strongly suspect that coyotes are a significant
influence on deer numbers. The former' commonly attribute the
increase in deer in the first half of this century to their control
efforts.
The general view among perhaps a majority of game biologists
is that coyotes are inept animals at preying on deer, and that
kills are infrequent. Division men challenge this view and aver
that coyote predation on deer is a more common event than is
widely believed.
These men are among the most skilled field observers in the
wildlife field. Their observations would almost certainly carry
weight even with the realization that their vested interest may
shade their interpretation of the observations. By late winter,
deer are weakened by food shortages, and in deep snow are vulnerable to predation.
But the problem here again is that of drawing inferences
from observations on individual kills to the significance of total
population phenomena. Historically, deer populations increased
over much of the United States in the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's.
Overpopulation symptoms were common in the 1940's (Leonard,
1946; Leopold et al., 1947). In Utah, deer were scarce when
European man arrived in the state in the 19th century. They
increased during the first half of this century, and probably reached
a peak in the late 1940's (Anon., 1966). Since such coyote-control
agents as coyote-getters, 1080, and thallium were first put in use
in the latter 1940's, most of these deer increases had taken place
before coyote reductions induced by these toxicants.
I would certainly not suggest that there may not be some
deer herds in western United States which are materially influenced
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by coyote predation. Knowlton (1964) and Cook et al. (1971)
have presented a convincing case for the Welder Refuge' on the
Texas coast with an especially heavy coyote density. But, on the
basis of existing evidence, one is inclined to remain uncertain that
coyote predation is of wide, general significance. And the implication is to question how much coyote control contributes to deer
management. I do not wish to imply that I view the question of the
role of predation or ungulate populations anywhere near a closed
issue. Most of the existing studies are on single predatory species:
wolves, mountain lions, or coyotes. The realities of a pristine,
multi-species predatory pressure on deer - wolves, mountain
lions, bobcats, coyotes, and bear - may be a very different story
from the effects of anyone of these.
There is some, although not unequivocal, evidence that coyote
predation acts as a depressant on pronghorn antelope populations
(cf. Udy, 1953; Arrington and Edwards, 1951; recent unpublished
evidence of Frederick Knowlton). Knowlton (Personal Communication) has pointed out that the Wyoming antelope populations
did not really begin to thrive until the beginning of 1080 use.
Workers in several other states have not found similar evidence,
but the question runs like a thread back through the literature
to early accounts cited by Seton (1929) and Dobie (1950). The
frequency and distribution of the observations make it seem a
real possibility that coyotes do, in some cases, exert some limitation on antelope numbers.
Effects on Small Prey Species. - Opponents of predator control have contended that the practice is unwise because predators
hold small mammal populations in check. These species allegedly
erupt into pest status in the absence of predatory restraint. These
contentions bring us into an area that is even more complex and
frought with uncertainty than the question of predatory restraints
on ungulate numbers. That uncertainty arises from the same reasons as the uncertainties existing in the subjects discussed above:
The absence of effective measurement, and the infrequency with
which an experimental approach is used. Although there has been
a great deal of research on predation, and a vast literature exists on
the subject, answers to the difficult population questions still remain uncertain: To what extent do individual predatory species,
and combinations thereof, influence the density of prey populations, and under what circumstances?

Time and space do not permit lengthy exposition of the subject here, but there is a strong body of opinion among animal
ecologists that highly fecund small mammal species undergo pro43

found population changes which relate largely to weather, food and
habitat conditions, and disease and parasites. The influence of
anyone pre atory species in this complex may well be, more often
than not, relatively minor. At best, perceptible predatory influence
may require the impact of aggregates of predator species (cf.
Craighead and Craighead, 1956).
In particular, rodent population densities over western United
States seem to be importantly influenced by vegetation changes,
often those associated with grazing. This subject was reviewed at
some length by D. L. Allen in Section III-D of the Cain Report.
Our own studies of recent years give some clue to the effectiveness of coyote predation on black-tailed jackrabbit populations
(Stoddart, 1970, 1971; Wagner and Stoddart, 1972) in northwestern Utah and southern Idaho. The jackrabbit is the dietary
staple for the coyote in this area, and in some years coyote predation was by far the major cause of jackrabbit mortality. However, the coyote population fluctuates, apparently because its
food supply does so as well. As coyotes decline, their impact on the
simultaneously declining rabbits eases. The point is eventually
reached at which the rabbit population is released. With a higher
reproductive rate than the coyotes, they need but a year or two
of relatively unrestrained increase and the coyotes can no longer
catch them even though they too have now begun to inrease.
The eventual curtailment and initial decline of jackrabbits
appears due perhaps to the onset of disease, perhaps exhaustion of
the food supply, perhaps self-induced reduction in reproductive
rate due to stress of high density and social unrest, or some combination of these. Once the rabbits have begun to decline, the
now abundant coyotes once again exist in a high ratio to rabbit
numbers, and their predation begins once again to have a material
impact.
Hence, the effect of the coyote appears to be primarily one
of hastening and deepening the decline phase of the rabbit population oscillation. The maximum densities to which the rabbits increase do not appear influenced by coyote predation, and in total
coyote predation does not appear to be a significant determinant
of rabbit numbers. This conclusion appears supported by Palmer's
(1897:45) early report of high rabbit and coyote number in this
same area prior to any kind of institutionalized predator control.
In short, I am rather skeptical of the effectiveness of coyote
predation alone in determining the density of small mammal populations, and by inference the claim that coyote control has been a
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significant influence in producing pest populations of small mammals. Collective, interspecies predator populations may be a different story.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Obviously the major emphasis of this report is in the ecological
aspects. I have neither the economic expertise nor any great deal of
new infonnation to make any major addition to what has already
been said about the economic aspects of the question. Yet, the
economic considerations begin with the ecological: What is the
magnitude of sheep loss and what are the costs of any given degree
of reduction in coyote numbers and in sheep loss. Some of the
findings from t his study shed some light on several economic considerations.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES

Several comparisons have been made of the costs of predator
control and the economic value of the sheep lost to predators
(d. Evanson, 1967, for review of such comparisons). The implication seems to be that this is tantamount to a cost-benefit analysis, with a high ratio of sheep-loss value to control cost implying
a favorable cost-benefit situation. Viewed in this way, and with
the existing estimates of predatory loss (d. Reynolds and Gustad,
1971), the ratios are usually quite favorable.
For example, the Nielson-Curle (1970) study suggested a 3
percent predatory loss rate, and a total sheep loss in Utah valued
at a little over $1 million. In this same year, Division of Wildlife
Services records show a total budget of about $300,000 of which
sheepmen contributed about half plus an additional $56,000 of
privately financed control (Nielson and Curle, 1970). Hence,
regardless of whether we contemplate the ratio of public funds or
of industry funds, or of the total control outlay to sheep loss,
it is a favorable one. (It should be pointed out that Nielson and
Curle did not make this type of cost-benefit comparison. I have
only used their data here to illustrate this type of comparison.)
However, this would seem to be a specious comparison, for
the funds spent on predator control clearly are not preventing the
3 percent loss. Hence, the economic value of that loss can hardly
be viewed as a benefit of the control cost. The proper comparison
would seem to be the cost of control weighed against the value of
sheep tha.t would be lost without that control. This latter is clearly
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a difficult figure to obtain, and no definite answer can be obtained.
But two sets of figures can be the basis for speculative comparisons, at least for the degree of control achieved by 1080.
In the more northerly states, 1080 may have cut coyote popula tions roughly in half (Figure 3). And those sets of data on
sheep predatory loss which extended over somr years of both
the pre-1080 and 1080 periods (Figure 5) sugges~, r! a reduction
of about one-half. Hence, on the basis of these figul'e& .l.bandonment of 1080 might conceivably witness a two-fold increase in
coyote populations and sheep predatory losses, whatever their
true level. And herein lies the key consideration.
If the Nielson'Curle estimate of 3 percent is near the truth,
then sheep losses might be expected to increase 3 percent. And in
this case, we would arrive at the same cost-benefit ratio calculated
above for Utah.

But in the analyses above, the total-loss rates of sheep in
northern states hardly changed following 1080 use (Table 2).
Losses in some states declined slightly, increased in others suggesting some statistical variation and raising the question of whether
total loss rates were changed at all by the use of 1080. At best,
the reductions were no more than 1 or 1.5 percent lower, implying
that if 1080 were abandoned, the total losses would rise by no more
than this amount at best. At 1 percent increased loss of Utah
sheep, the ratio of present predator-control cost to value of sheep
saved now becomes about 1: 1, or in other words no gain on the
expenditure.
All of this is speculative, of course, because of the uncertainties surrounding the available loss estimates. These uncertainties
emphasize the need for critical, carefully taken measurements of
losses.
LIVESTOCK INSURANCE

A great deal has been said about the possibility of loss insurance as an alternate means of economic protection to predator
control. Most opponents of predator control wish no economic
hardship on sheep men, and many indicate a willingness to support an insurance program as an alternate. This possibility was
discussed at some length in the Cain Report, and will only be
touched on briefly here.
To begin with, the prospect of an insurance program to
cover predatory losses alone seems forbidding. It is difficult to
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identify predator kills in many cases, and the cost of investigating
all such claims would seem to be prohibitively expensive. With
several hundred sheep ranchers in each major sheep state, each
sustaining some predatory losses each year, the claim adjustment
problem seems out of the question.
However, total-loss insurance would seem to have more
promise. Sheepmen now lose animals from a variety of causes,
perhaps averaging somewhere around 8 to 11 percent (Table 2).
These are losses for which they have no protection, and which
cut substantially into their profit margin. The administrative
advantage of total-loss insurance is that no interpretations of the
cause of loss are required and the claim adjustment problem
greatly simplified.
Losses could perhaps be ascertained by comparing January 1
inventories plus the lamb crop with the number of lambs sold each
year, plus the December 31 inventory. The difference would be
the number of sheep lost to all causes. Verification of figures could
perhaps be coupled with tax assessment which also requires an
inventory and which could provide a check.
Some critics of the insurance idea contend that fraudulent
claims would scuttle such a plan, or that inept and inefficient operators would benefit at the expense of skilled sheepmen who maintained their losses at low levels. Premiums could perhaps be adjusted to an operator's loss record, and be subject to annual review.
This would enable the better, more successful operators to enjoy
the benefit of lower rates.
Some speculative figures for the state of Utah might be as
follows: Utah ranchers grazed roughly 1.7 million sheep in the
state in fiscal 1970-71 (incorrectly given in the Cain report as 1
million). Losses in recent years (Table 2) have averaged about 9
percent, but let us use 10 as a round figure and on the possibility
that some abatement of predator control would permit some increase in predation. Hence, the loses due to all causes would be
roughly 170,000. At a mean value of $20 per head, the value of the
losses would approach $3.4 million. On a statewide basis, a levy
of roughly $2 per head would fully underwrite such losses.
On the average, this outlay would return to the industry
as payment of claims, and the industry as a whole would suffer
no loss. However, as we saw above (Figure 4) most operators
suffer below-average loss. In anyone year, a typical operator might
be assessed a premium based on a 10 percent average industry
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loss, but realize only a 5 percent return based on losses of that
magnitude. The exceptional operator with a 20-percent loss, and
who had paid premiums based on a lO-percent average expected
loss, would realize a profit.
Presumably these inequities would average out to some degree
over a period of years as heavy losses moved by chance from
operator to operator. And the variability of total losses may be
less than that given in these hypothetical examples, and as seem
to be true of predator losses (Figure 4). No total-loss raw data
were available at the time this was written, and before any
program was developed such data would need careful scrutiny.
There are three possible ways of reducing the premium costs.
One would be to establish a deductible clause which provided that
no claims below a certain minimum would receive payment. This
would affect a large number of operators if the total-loss distribution is at all similar to the predator-loss pattern (Figure 4).
A second means for reducing the premiums would be to question the $20-per-head value assigned above. Some of the losses are
among very young lambs. One may question whether a very small
lamb should be appraised at the full market value of a large, fall
lamb. Nielson and Curle (1970) have contended that a young
lamb should receive such valuation, but it is perhaps an arguable
point.
A third means for reducing the premium cost would be a
partial government subsidy. Premiums would be reduced to the
degree that the cost was subsidized.
All of this is speculative and needs careful study by actuarial
experts in collaboration with industry spok!;)smen. But it would
seem to have sufficient promise to bear thorough scrutiny.
THE QUESTION OF SUBSIDIES

The mention of partially subsidizing insurance premiums
raises the entire question of subsidy. Many critics of predator
control decry the practice because they are paying in part for
something with their own tax dollars which they object to on principle in the first place. In the next section, I will suggest that the
public bears some moral obligations in this direction, but for
the present let us consider the question of subsidy on purely economic and social grounds.
It is true that the industry is subsidized in several ways: The
public funds used in predator control; the tariff on foreign wool
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which maintains American wool products at higher prices than
would exist if foreign products were allowed free competition; and a
grazing fee charged to stockmen for the use of public lands which
in the eyes of some critics is below the real value received for such
grazing privileges. Some critics imply that such subsidies are
somehow unethical, and that meat and wool products should
somehow be left to unsupported competition. If the industry
falters in the process, then this is simply the realities of life in a
laissez-faire situation.
This point is arguable on principle, but pragmatically it is a
somewhat anachronistic view in an era when our economy is anything but laissez-faire, and is perfused with an untold number and
variety of subsidies. The point is especially well made by Evanson
(1967:210-211) :
The fact that sheepmen try to get as much subsidization as possible to carry out control programs is a matter of
political reality in a mixed economy wherein the 'gravy train'
is a generally accepted mode of socio-economic conveyance.
Criticism of sheep-raisers for their willingness to seek maximal public assistance must be tempered with recognition of
the similar lobbying and pressure tactics of countless other
interest groups, from the farmers and cattlemen who compete with the sheepmen for land to the trade unions whose
successes contribute to the rising costs of all labor inputs
including herders, wranglers and shearers. The pressures
exerted by woolgrowers for general predator control are
assailable not on grounds of political immorality but on their
economic and ecological unsoundness.
To these points one may only add that any subsidy is, in
principle, tacit acknowledgement of marginal economic viability.
It is justified, not per se on the enhancement of profit margins for
the institution to which it is directed. Rather, it is justified on (1)
the benefits of continued survival of that institution and its goods
and services to society; and (2) in a socially conscious society,
the concern for preventing the institution's individuals from suffering economic and social upheaval. Wool, lamb, and mutton are
desirable products for our society. One may argue that foreign
products could outcompete our own. But it seems desirable to
perpetuate the capacity for producing them in this country against
a future time when an expanded world population will make
demands on all areas capable of producing food and fiber.
The sheep industry has declined markedly in the past 30
years. In the states discussed in the preceding pages, the number
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of sheep grazed today is only one-third to one-half the number
grazed in the 1930's or early 1940's when the industry reached
its peak. This reduction has occurred because of increasing economic squeeze, growing operational problems (e.g., difficulty of getting competent herders), and particularly in those states with
large amounts of public land, reduction in grazing quotas in the
interest of range improvement. Like many of the criticisms of
predator control, comments on range degradation caused by the
sheep industry have almost reached cliche status. In the past, such
degradation has certainly taken place, and some is still going on.
But the general trend, at least on public lands, has gradually been
reversed, and continued improvement can be expected in the years
ahead. Management of public lands by the public agencies still
undoubtedly has considerable room for advancement, but it is increasingly competent and there has been a great deal of progress
in the past 20 years.
Whatever the causes, it is clear that the U.S. sheep industry
opera tes on a narrow economic margin. Any increased cost would
make more difficult an already strained situation. It is for this
reason that subsidy has a role, if we grant that the industry is a
desirable part of our society.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There is more to the rising public opposition to predator
control than the ecological and economic issues. Indeed, there is a
strong moral tone to that opposition, and for this reason the
ethical aspects of the question bear scrutiny. It is quite possible
that these aspects will carry more weight in the decisions that are
ultimately made than the purely ecological and economic, although
we shall see below that what may be ecologically wise and economically beneficial to the stockman takes on ' the elements of a
moral "ought."
The last century and first half of this one constitute an era in
which the pursuit of a high, material living standard was the
socially approved, major preoccupation of the nation's citizenry.
That living standard had to be extracted from the natural environment; and while the environment was richly endowed with resources it often posed hardships which had to be overcome in order
to reach the goal of material wealth. Hence, any resistance in
the environment was viewed from a single-value, utilitarian perspective as an obstacle to be pushed aside. Except for a few voices
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crying in the wilderness like Thoreau and Leopold, this utilitarian
view of the world was seldom questioned. Predatory animals
fell in this category. They were viewed largely as an impediment
to profit-taking by the livestock industry, and hence, were a useless thing to be reduced if not extirpated. Although wildlife of all
kinds in the United States have been considered a public resource
since the beginning of the republic, few voices were raised against
this destruction of public property by a minority of the populace.

In recent years, the combined disenchantment with material
values and realization that the quest for those values is depleting
our resources and threatening irrevocable damage to our environment have led to serious questions, if not rejection, of the century
and-a-half-old Amerian value system. These growing doubts have
been paralleled by a rising romanticism; and by an awakening
to, and growing love for, the nation's natural heritage. Paradoxically, the latter has been made possible by the mobility and leisure
time afforded by our high standard of living.
Within this growing romantic and naturalistic climate, all
parts of nature are viewed with a new set of values. I t is the
land as a whole which collectively built the riches and beauty
of the continent, and predatory animals are inextricably a part of
this total system which we call the land. One cannot cherish some
parts and reject others, for the whole is only what it is with all of
its parts. Leopold (1953) stated the view very well in his
characteristically lyric prose:
By land is meant all of the things on, over, or in the earth.
Harmony with land is like harmony with a friend; you cannot
cherish his right hand and chop off his left. That is to say,
you cannot love game and hate predators; you cannot conserve the waters and waste the ranges; you cannot build the
forest and mine the farm. The land is one organism. Its parts,
like our own parts, compete with each other and cooperate
with each other. The competitions are as much a part of the
inner workings as the co-operations. You can regulate them
-cautiously-but not abolish them.
The outstanding scientific discovery of the twentieth
century is not television, or radio, but rather the complexity
of the land organism. Only those who know the most about
it can appreciate how little we know about it. The last
word in ignorance is the man who says of an animal or plant:
'What good is it?' If the land mechanism as a whole is good,
then every part is good, whether we understand it or not. If
the biota, in the course of aeons, has built something we like
but do not understand, then who but a fool would discard
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seemingly useless parts? To keep every cog and wheel is the
first precaution of intelligent tinkering.
The American public, now awakened to its statutory ownership of
the wildlife resource, and cherishing it from a broader, less utilitarian perspective, will no longer unquestioningly accept the reduction of that resource by any minority of the population.
Yet, the public ownership of wild animals would seem to
carry with it some element of responsibility, or even liability.
Where one's possessions cause loss to those of another, the owner
seemingly bears some obligation to the person affected. There are
already a number of precedents for this principle in the case of
wildlife. In many states, where deer, elk, beaver, or other wild
animals cause damage to agricultural crops or other private property, the state assumes responsibility either for compensation to
the property owner for his loss, or for removal of the offending
animals.
This same principle would seem to apply in the case of predatory animals killing livestock. The situation seems quite clear-cut
in the case of livestock losses on private land. Losses on public
land, where stockmen pay for seasonal grazing rights, pose a somewhat less clear-cut case, but may still fall within the principle.
This right to redress for property damage is another justification
for public subsidy of some form , as discussed above. Alternatives
include predator control, compensation with public funds for
losses, or partial subsidy of an insurance program.
There is, however, more to the moral indignation over predator control than the loss of public property at the hands of a minority. There evidently is a widespread feeling that predator control,
particularly those techniques which cause violent death, is morally
wrong in some deep sense. Many of the persons holding this view
undoubtedly do not stop to ask why it is wrong, but simply maintain the conviction on strong, unquestioned emotional grounds.
It is fair to ask the authoritative basis for such convictions.
We live, ..afterall, in an era when few moral premises have gone
unchallenged, and when many have been rejected. And if such
convictions are to be strong forces in policy decisions, it is reasonable to enquire about their bases.
There would seem to be only two answers to the philosophical
question of what makes a certain act right or wrong. The first is
Divine Edict which carries the teleological implication that the
rightness or wrongness of an act is judged according to its place
in some Grand Plan for existence.

52

We live, however, in an increasingly secular and humanistic
age when even the traditional, institutionalized religions are making concessions to "situation ethics." In this second, alternative
answer to the question of rightness and wrongness, morality
increasingly takes on a pragmatic role. Those acts which promote
survival, happiness, and social order for the individuals in a society
are deemed to be right or moral. Those acts which create unhappiness, disorder, and threats to survival are deemed to be wrong.
In this context, predator control seems implicitly to be deemed
immoral on two counts. The first is on the count of humaneness,
and killing animals in this way is implied to foster a callousness
which may carryover 'into the way human beings relate to each
other. Although the research and control divisions of the Bureau
of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife have made progress in the direction
of making coyote control species-specific and humane, no one
including Division of Wildlife Services field agents, denies that the
symptoms of 1080 poisoning are grim to behold in a dying coyote.
Dobie (1950) has argued that engaging in such control activities tends to perpetuate a callous attitude toward animals developed during the frontier era in much of American society. Himself a seasoned outdoorsman, rancher, and horseman, Dobie advocated the transition to a more "civilized perspective" which includes a feeling of sympathy and tolerance for animals other than
our own species. The implication seems to be that we will become
more tolerant, restrained, and civilized in our relations with our
fellow man.
The second count on which predator control is deemed immoral is the risk that it incurs for continued environmental health.
Whether one accepts alarmist or conservative predictions of the
effects of human activities on the environment, there seems little
doubt that we cannot continue to exploit and despoil at our present
rate without sooner or later imperiling our existence. As Leopold
states in the passages cited above, we still do not have sufficient
understanding of the complexities of the ecosystem. Hence, it
seems desirable to perturb that system as little as possible in order
to minimize the risks of unforeseen, irrevocable change (Wagner,
1969). If we can derive our needs and comforts without a given
perturbation, such would seem to be desirable. The information
in Table 2 suggests that we might be able to forego some aspects
of widespread intensive predator control, e.g., use of toxic agents.
Leopold (1933a, 1947) suggested that such restraint would
not be attained until we develop a new ethic in which we extend
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the same ethical precepts to the land that we now extend to
other human beings:
A thing is right only when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the community, and the community
includes the soil, waters, fauna , and flora as well as people.
WHAT COURSE OF ACTION?
We now come to the point of decision between several courses
of action. We have weighed the available evidence and considered
a number of aspects of the problem. To the scientist, the evidence
leaves much to be desired for much of it does not come from carefully planned and executed research, and that which does may well
be fraught with biases of unknown form and magnitude. Yet, with
all its uncertainties, the available evidence would seem to be a
better basis on which to make decisions than the many impressions, emotionally loaded biases, and misconceptions which abound
on this subject.
In review, the eviaence we have examined suggests the following : (1) Coyote control does reduce coyote numbers to some degree in some areas. (2) This reduction in coyote numbers does not
appear to reduce total sheep losses materially, and by implication
increases in coyote numbers might not be the economic coup de
grace that sheepmen fear. (3) Control efforts do not have the
marked side effects on the ecosystem which its opponents claim.
These conclusions are drawn for predator control as currently
practiced in most states, largely by the Division of Wildlife Services. Greatly intensified effort, either by the existing control
groups, or by large numbers of private individuals might well
produce a very different picture.
What, then, are the alternate decisions? One can consider first
the extremes: Intensification of control, or total abandonment.
If given their choice, most sheepmen would probably opt for intensified control. But in view of the public pressures now being
brought to bear, this alternative seems out of the question. Moreover, it cannot be advocated seriously on ecological, economic,
or ethical grounds. Indeed, it does not seem that the status quo
can, or should, be maintained.
What of total abandonment? We have suggested above that
the stockman has some right to protection from offending animals.
Few critics of predator control go so far as to deny this. One can
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suggest a loss payment or insurance program as an alternative to
control, but there are uncertainties about the workability of the
insurance idea. And, utilitarian view or not, it seems unnecessarily
wasteful to stand by and let a coyote kill large numbers of lambs
out of a flock and not do something about it.
There is also reason to fear that stockmen would take control
into their own hands if no control organziation were available. In
this event, society would loose control over, and record of, what
is taking place. The risk of dire effects would then increase substantially.
Whatever the eventual decision, it seems important to bar t he
private operator from systematic control except, perhaps, in emergency situations. This can be accomplished best by effective,
well-enforced state laws. In the past, state departments of natural
resources have been primarily concerned with game species. But
as public awareness and appreciation of nature have broadened,
these agencies are more and more recognizing a responsibility for
the protection and husbandry of all wild animal species. Predators
have increasingly received this recognition. Mountain lions have
been placed on the game animal list in Utah, and timber wolves
have been afforded complete protection in states where they are
nearing extinction.
The more common predators, like coyotes, could be similarly
protected by state laws which made sport hunting and fur trapping
legal under license, season, and bag provisions. And such laws
could provide for control activities by authorized, government employees, either state or federal. The Cain Report recommended
additional deterrents to private control. One was a ban on shooting from planes by unauthorized persons. And it recommended
revocation of public grazing permits for individuals who engaged
in illegal predator control on public lands.
If the extremes among the alternative courses of action seem
to have shortcomings, what of the other alternatives? Nothing
would convince stockmen more effectively that abandonment of
generalized coyote population reduction, especially the use of toxic
agents, does not result in prohibitively increased stock losses than
to see it demonstrated on a limited basis. The same can be said
of the success of an insurance venture. If stockmen in three or
four western states would volunteer to accept a 5-year experimental abandonment of poisons and seriously try the insurance
idea, they could assume a leadership role and remove some of the
public ill will that has built up against them in recent years. If as
successful as anticipated, this plan could ease the transition to
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complete abandonment of toxicants at the end of 5 years. It
should be accompanied by careful evaluation through well-designed
research, and the enactment of state laws described above.
Although the evidence we have reviewed suggests that sheep
losses viewed as a state-wide or region-wide statistical phenomenon
may be less than stockmen commonly believe, there is no question
that some ranchers experience heavy, concentrated losses. The
number of such losses could conceivably increase with relaxation
of control. If we have any sense of social concern, we will not
deny that these individuals deserve some measure of protection
from such losses. Hence, it seems desirable to retain some mechanism that can carry out a trouble-shooting type of control. That
effort can best be provided by some governmental organization,
either state or federal, with a trained group of control agents.
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